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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE
ESTATE OF VENNA DARLENE
BERM, Deceased. EDWARD C.
BERM.
Protestant arnd Respondent,
CAsE No.

vs.

7305

AL~IA

GEE, personally, and as
administrator of the Estate of
Verma Darlene Behm, Deceased,
Appellant.

BRIEF OF RE,SPONDENT

ADDITIONS TO STATEMENT OF FACTS

In what the appellant terms the ''Statement of
Facts", there are many things omitted or passed over
lightly, which the res,pondent feels should be brought to
the attention of this court.
On page three of appellant's brief, the appellant
sets out that the District Court of Salt Lake County
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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authorized the administrator to make a settlement in the
sum of $15,000.00 and to ·pay therefrom to his attorney,
Shirley P. Jones, the sum of $3,750.00 attorney's fees
''solely for services rendered in making and securing
said settlement''. Respondent feels that attention should
be called to paragraph three of the petition of Alma Gee
(R. 11-13), wherein he petitioned the court for authority
to settle the ease against Doctor Holbrook and allowance
for attorney's fees.
''That through the efforts of your petitioner's
attorney, Shirley P. Jones, the said Dr. Von G.
Holbrook has offered to pay to your petitioner
for the benefit of the estate * * * ''
That on page five of appellant's brief it states the
administrator then petitioned the court ''for distribution
to himself by virtue of the said 'Assignment' and to
the said minors, or in the alternative that he be allowed
a quantum meruit for his services in the event the other
distribution should be denied.''
The res1pondent feels that the court should have its
attention called to the fact that on the 23rd day of April,
1948, Alma Gee was cited into court to show cause why

he should not be required to disburse immediately the
$11,250.00 set forth in the petition to the heirs of the

deceased, and further to show cause why this court
should not declare the pretended assignment of April 28,
1947, to be null and void and of no effect (R. 22), and
that on the day it came on for hearing, to-wit, April 27,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1948, Attorney Jones served on res·pondent 's attorneys
objections to citation claiming:
1. That it appeared that Edward C. Behm was not
interested in the matter.
2. That the matters set forth in the petition for
order to show eause are not matters that can be determined in probate.
3. That it appeared from the petition that Behm
had no interest in the matter, and that if he claims to
have an interest, he should be required to proceed under
the code of civil procedure.
4. That the citation and ipetition for order to show
cause are not the proper methods of procedure to determine the matters and things set forth in the petition for
order to show cause.
5. That citation in probate cannot replace a summons and cannot be a substitute therefor.
6. That it appeared that Behm would contest any
petition for distribution and that the court could not
determine the distributees or the amount of distribution
unless and until a determination of the rights of Edward
C. Behm had been made in a proper proceeding brought
for that purpose.
7. That Alma Gee individually or personally was
not before the ·court in this rproceeding and his rights
cannot be determined therein.
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That said matter was taken under advisement by
the Honorable J. Allan Crockett, and that on the 20th
day of May, 1948, he entered his o"rder overruling objections to the citation and ordered that Alma Gee be and
appear before the court ten days after notice. That this
notice was served on the 16th day of August, 1948, on
Attorney Jones and was made returnable the lOth day
of September, 1948, and that the said Alma Gee then
did not, as set forth in ap~pellant 's brief on page five,
merely ask that the court distribute to himself by virtue
of assignment and the minors, or in the alternative that
he be allowed a quantum meruit for his services in the
event the other distribution be denied, but that he also
filed a complete final report and account and petition for
distribution and discharge, which set out practically
everything usually put out in closing of a decedent's
estate, except .as to having the vouchers of the last
illness and funeral expenses attached. It set out the
costs, which included publication of notice to creditors
and other matters. That it set out in the petition that
1petitioner had on hand in cash the balance of $11,218.80
for distribution to himself as guardian of said minors,
and to himself personally as assignee of said Behm,
and that he set out in said petition that he was entitled
to a fee as administrator or trustee, in addition to his
assigned share, in the sum of $460.00, and he had arranged
with Attorney Shirley P. Jones to accept the sum of
$500.00 for his fee in the estate matter and also for his
fee in the guardianship matter in the estates of said
minors. He set forth that the ~p~etition of Behm to set
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aside the assignment was ""ithout merit, sham and false,
and he, Gee, 'vas entitled to the reasonable value of his
services, and that the services consist of the aforesaid
guardianship proceedings, the suit against Von G. Holbrook, and that said services are reasonably "\Vorth the
sum of $4,210.00, which he was willing to reduce to
$460.00 upon receiving one-third of the aforesaid
$11,218.80.
ADDITIONS TO TESTIMONY

The appellant in presenting the testimony at the
hearing has_ stressed parts of the evidence and passed
over much other evidence and omitted some entirely; so,
the respondent at this time will submit the following for
the court's attention:
Alma Gee was sixty-three years old (R. 130). He
works for wages for the Kearns Corporation as a guard
and receives $150.00 'Per month. He took the money, the
$11,250.00, and deposited it in the bank and took it out
on the advice of Attorney Larson (R. 136) ; he put the
moneys in various places in his house, in his locker, and
he paid Mr. Larson $200.00 (R. 137-8).
Mr. Gee first stated he did not know how much
money he had left (R. 132). The court several times had
to insist that Mr. Gee tell about the money. The first
time (R. 132), up,on demand of counsel for Behm that
Mr. Gee bring the money into court, Mr. Jones stated:
"MR. JONES: At this time, I assumed this
money
was in Continental National Bank and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

G

Trust Company in deposits in the name of the
guardian. ' ' ( R. 133)
Gee first received the money about the 8th of January, $15,000.00, and received a check from Jones. In
April he withdrew the money because he did not think
it was safe (R. 133-5). He said that he paid some bills,
including $200.00 to Mr. Larson (R. 138). Mr. Gee could
not tell whether he had spent $1,000.00, $2,000.00 or
$5,000.00 of the money. The court again admonished
Mr. Gee that he had better answer, at which time he
said he thought there was $6,000.00 or $7,000.00 left of
the money, and said he doubted if there ~as $7,000.00
left. Mr. Gee stated that he knew he only had a $100.00
bond up in the matter. The court again admonished Mr.
Gee (R. 139). Again the court ordered Mr. Gee to.bring
the money in by 2:00 o'clock (R. 140).
Miss Beveridge, of the Continental National Bank,
testified that the opening deposit by Mr. Gee was on
January 28, 1948, of $5,000.00 and on May 7, 1948,
there was a withdrawal of $4,999.00, leaving a balance
of $1.00 which left the account open, and that on May 13,
1948, there was a deposit of $11,250.00, m~king a balance
of $11,251.00, and on June 30, 1948, a withdrawal of
$11,250.00, leaving a balance of $1.00.
After the noon recess, at 2 :00 o'clock, Mr. Gee again
took the stand and stated that he had the $7,500.00 for
the babies. Upon Mr. MeCarty's demand and the court's
order, this $7,500.00 was given to the clerk and impounded. About this time, Mr. Jones had great qualms
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as to 'Yhether he

"~as

violating any of the canons of

ethics of the American Bar Association, and after some
discussion and assurance that his 'professional standing
would not be lessened in any "\Yay, he decided to remain
in the case, even though he were a witness, to 'vhich

respondent's attorneys had and still have no objection.
Mr. Gee remembered being in Judge Crockett's
court on the 28th of April, 1948, on an order to show
cause

"~hy

he should not be required to disburse the

$11,250.00 and to show cause why the assignment, Exhibit 6, should not be declared null and void ( R. 148),
and thereafter, on May 7, 1948, he withdrew the money
from the bank the first time. He put the money back in
the bank on May 13, 1948 (R. 150). He had it out of the
bank for six days. Upon the demands of Mr. McCarty
to know what he had done with the balance of $3,750.00,
he stated he had

sp~ent

$550.00 on his daughter, and upon

demand as to where the rest of the money was, and upon
the court telling him he was $3,000.00 shy, the witness
shouted:
''A. Give them the three thousand, and give
them all if they want it all.
'' Q.

Have you the $3,000.00 here f

"A. I have hoarded that money for ten
months. I am sick of it.
"THE COURT: Yes, I want you to give the
money you have, to be divided.
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''MR. McCARTY: May we have that counted
and placed in" A.

I hope that balances it.

''THE COURT : Well, I was quite certain that
that six thousand was going to be increased
around here when we got down into it. That's
why I wasn't very patient this morning.'' (R.
153)
Thereupon $3,000.00 more was paid into court. Mr. Gee
testified that before this matter started he knew that if
Behm had any idea there would be any big money recovered, he, Behm, would want part of it (R. 156).
Gee admitted that when he signed the petition for
discharge he had the sum of $11,218.80 for distribution,
hut qualified himself by saying he signed it on the spur
of the moment (R. 162).
Mr. Larson's cross-examination brought out the
fact that he, Larso11, had informed Mr. Gee that it was
not a probate case (R. 163).
That later, about the 22d or 24th of August, Gee
retained Mr. Larson, and at that time he informed
Attorney Larson that he was afraid Behm would attach
part of the money, and that Larson told him to remove
it to some other bank or take care of it in such a way
that he would not attach it (R. 163). Gee testified that
in discussing the suit with Behm he said, ''Let's go in
partners, Ed'', and he said, ''No, I don't want anything
to do with it at all" (R. 203).
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Gee also testified that he told Behm he would see
Mr. Jones and see what he says, and that when Behm
would not go in with him on it, he said, ''When you
give me 'permission to sue on this, then you are out of
it" (R. 204).
Shirley P. Jones was first called by protestant. Mr.
Jones testified he only kne"\v Mr. Gee on this case. He
did not know that he was employed as a watchman, and
did not know what his position was except that he understood Mr. Gee worked for the po,ver comp~any.
Mr. Jones knew that when he gave him his check,
Exhibit 9, a check for $11,250.00, payable to Alma Gee,
administrator estate V enna Darlene Behm, that there
was only a $100.00 bond up in each case, and knew that
the bond was signed by Alma Gee's wife and one other
member of the family. Mr. Jones testified that the court
fixed the bond and the court knew about the settlement
(R. 166-8).
Witness Jones was called by the appellant. He first
became interested in the case against Doctor Holbrook
the last of February or the first of March, 1947, and the
people that he talked to about the case were Mr. and
Mrs. Gee ; in fact, they were the only people he talked
to about the case (R. 179). The only time he talked
to Mr. Behm was when he signed the petition on the
11th of AJpril, 1947. Mr. Jones testified that _there had
been a lot of preliminary work getting the petitions for
filing, and when they were ready Mr. Gee brought Mr.
Behm in and introduced him to Attorney Jones, and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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he gave Mr. Behm the pe~ition for ap~pointment of administrator and the petition for appointment of guardian
and asked Mr. Behm to read them, which he did. Mr.
Jones asked him why he did not go ahead as administrator and why he did not go ahead as guardian, being
the husband and father, and said he explained to him
that he and the two twins were the only ones that could
recover under the law. Behm replied that he did not
want anything to do with it, and he said, ''If you sign
these documents, you authorize Mr. Gee to take charge
of the estate and to take charge of the property of the
minors, and you are out", and Behm said, ''Yes, I
understand that" (R. 182). Witness Jones could not
remember the wording, but he said something was said
by him or Mr. Gee that 1\fr. Gee was not willing to undertake all this unless there was some assignment in the
case, and it was as a result of the conversation in
Attorney Jones' office that he drew the document, the
assignment.
Mr. Jones stated he took Behm in to Gordon Strong,
a notary public, introduced him, and said, ''This is the
father of the babies in the Holbrook case and the husband, and he is signing away his rights to his fatherin-law, and I want you to notarize it", and Mr. Strong
did. Attorney Jones denies that Behm ealled Mr. Langlois.
Mr. Jones said that in November or December, after
the attorneys for Doctor Holbrook wanted to settle the
matter, that Behm came in, said he had some valuable
evidence which consisted of a stateinent of some nurse
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that they could get a hundred thousand dollars from
Doctor Holbrook. Witness Jones said, ''This matter is
going along all rig-ht", and Behm said, "Well, I am
going to see the attorneys for Doctor Holbrook", and
'Vitness Jones said, ''You stay away from the attorneys
for Doctor Holbrook; you have nothing to do with this
matter" (R. 183-A, not marked). He left and Attorney
Jones never SR\Y him again until he came into his office
with ~fr. Langlois.
He did not ask Behm to come and see him. He had
everything prepared before Behm came to his office
except the assignment. He did not discuss the amount
that Behm had put up for doctor bills. Mr. Jones, when
asked 'vhether he treated this as an estate and gave
notice to creditors, stated that he ~paid no attention to it;
that there was no controversy; the only thing he wanted
to have was an administrator appointed and bring a
law suit.
Jones said that he prepared the final account and
report and petition for distribution and discharge, and
that he asked for $500.00 additional, that he figured that
the estate and guardianship matters from the beginning
to the conclusion were worth that (R.. 187). Then Mr.
Jones testified: "I agreed with you that the trust company should be the one that would handle this mon,ey for
the children and that that would be satisfactory with
me" (R. 188).
Mfl,

~vur

Jones did not inform B·ehm there had been a
$15,000.00 settlement. He did not see any occa'Sion to.
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He treated the matter as an estate, hut did not inquire
about funeral expenses (R. 188). Mr. Jones .never discussed with Gee who paid the funeral expenses and did
not ask about them. He did not make any endeavor to
find out whether or not they had been paid. '
'' Q. Did you feel it would be a fair assignment for this man, if the bills had not been paid,
that Mr. Behm should pay the bills and also turn
over a third of what was recovered less your fee
to Mr. Gee~

"A. I never thought anything about it, Mr.
McCarty. Mr. Behm was completely disinterested
in the whole thing. At the time it came to me,
it didn't appear that there would be any recovery.

"Q. Oh, it didn't appear at the time when
he signed that petition, you didn't think there
would be any recovery~
"A. I didn't say that.
'' Q. Well, did you think there would be a re·Covery when he signed the petition for guardian
and for administrator~
''A. I thought if there was any recovery and
Mr. Gee did ·all the work and carried all the responsibility, that he should be p·rotected in it.''

J one'S also testified that he told Behm that he was
entitled to one-third of whatever was recovered; in fact,
he said he read him the statute. Thereupon, counsel
for respondent asked ·him to show the statute, that he
would be interested in reading that statute that showed
one-third. Whereupon Mr. Jones states, "It is the death
statute of the p1ersonal representative and the heirs",

Mlf•
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and said he interpreted it always that they share in th·e
proportion that they are heirs. All papers were prepared
for Mr. Behm when he came up to Attorney Jones' office
except Exhibit 6, the assignment (R. 191-2).
1yt

ff

I

After the conference on the 11th, 11 Jones testified
that he drew the assignment, gave it to Alma Gee to
have Behm sign it, and bring it back. Mr. Jones testified
as to all the consultations in his office with Mr. Gee.
H~ did not give notice to Mr. Behm in the petition for
permiS'sion to settle the claim. He said Mr. Behm was
out of it (R. 199).
ARGUMENT

The respondent feels that he should discuss Point
II out of order for the reason that if we have a clear
understanding as to what is involved in this ca~e, we will
make the remainder of the que'Stions much easier to
dispose of.

POINT II
DISTRIBUTION AND PROPORTIONS OF DISTRIBUTION OF THE
RECOVERY.

It is obvious from the whole proceedings in this case
that app,ellant was laboring under the impression that
this was a probate action and that the action for wrongful death belonged to the estate. The assignment, Exhibit 6, attempts to assign an interest in an estate; the
petition for permission to settle claims (R. 11-13), objecSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tions to order to show cause (R. 24-25), final report and
account and petition for distribution and discharge
(R. 31-34) all seem to be based on the assump·jon that
this was a probate matter. Attorney Larson i11formed
Mr. Gee that it was not a probate case (R. 163). It was
evidently after Mr. Larson's entry into the case that
the attorney for the appellant began to realize t:1at this
was not a probate case.
That the case for wrongful death is no part of a
decedent's estate is the established law in Utah. Quoting
from Morrison v. Perry, 104 U. 151, 140 P. (2) 772 at
page 780:
"It is undisputed in the evidence that deceased's widow paid $819.40 for funeral services
and that this amount was reasonable. There is,
however, no evidence that the estate was insolvent, nor was there evidence to show whether
or not the widow made a claim against the estate
for reimbursement, or whether or not she was in
fact reimbursed from the estate. If the widow
was reimbursed from the estate was she damaged
in this particular~ The answer is obviously no,
if we keep in mind that the estate is separate. and
distinct from the plaintiff or the statutory beneficiaries in this action. The estate may be damaged to that extent but the estate is not a party
under our death statute. Mason v. Union Pacific
Railway Co., 7 Utah 77, 24 P. 796.
(At rp,ag·e 781) ''This court in the case of
Mason v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 7 Utah 77, 24 P.
796, held that the death statute, 104-3-11 of the
R.S.U. 1933, was not a survival statute but that
it created a new cause of action in the heirs.
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The ~Iason case, supra, has since been approved
in Halling Y. Industrial Commission of Utah, et
v,l.~ 71 lTtah 112, 263 P. 78. ''
Of ·bourse, suit could be maintained by the administrator of an estate of decedent, but the recovery for the
"Tongful death \Yould not be subject to the debts of the
decede:ih nor eXJl'enses of administration of the decedent's
estate. In ·other words, the administrator \Y·ould be acting
in a dual capacity, that is, as representative of the heirs
in the wrongful death, and administrator of the decedent's estate, and they definitely would have to be kept
separate.
To justify the appellant's actions throughout, he
must justify his attempts to distribute the recovery for
wrongful death according to our laws of distribution in
probate. Appellant's brief has given us a ~art of the
history of our wrongful death statute, but for some
reason or other he has not given us

h.

complete history

of the act. The Compiled Laws of Utah, 1888, Vol. 2,
page 179, state:
''Sec. 2961. Whenever the death of a person
shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as
would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the
party injured to maintain an action and recover
damages in resp·ect thereof, then, and in every
such case, the person who, or the com1)!any or
corporation which would have been liable if death
had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for
damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the death shall have
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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been caused under such circumstances as amount
in law to felony.
"Sec. 2962. That every such action shall be
brought by, and in the names of the personal
representatives of such deceased person, and the
amount received in every such action shall be
distributed by direction and decree of the proper
pro hate court, to such persons (other than creditors) as are by law entitled to distributive shares
of the estate of such deceased !person, and in
such porportions as are prescribed by law. Provided, that every such action shall he commenced
within two years after the death of such deceased
lp1erson; and provided further, that the damages
so recovered shall not in any case exceed the
sum of ten thousand dollars. ''
Thus, we see that at one time we had the method of
distribution that app1ellant is now so ardently claiming
is the only fit and proper procedure. However, the legislature, in 1901, repealed section 2962. The legislature
certainly did not rep·eal that section because it wanted to
keep that method of distribution in force.
The case of In Re Riccomi (Sup. Ct. Calif., 1921), 197 ·

P. 97, 14 A.L.R. 509, discusses this very question, and
holds that it is the 1pecuniary loss to the heir by reason
of the death· that is recoverable, and that only, and that
it follows inevitably that there can he no substantial
recovery on account of any heir who has not suffered
any substantial pecuniary injury. The case at bar and
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the Riceomi case seem to coincide in more than one way.
We quote:
· (At 14 A.L.R. 511) ''A review of the decisions in this state under this statu tory provision
makes it clear that the claim of the appellant is
based upon a complete misconception of the settled
construction of the statute and its purpose and
object.
·
"It is settled that the action authorized by the
section is -one solely for the benefit of the heirs,
by which they may be compensated for the pecuniary loss suffered by them by reason of the loss
of their relatives. The money recovered constitutes no part of the estate of deceased, and where
the action is· brought or the money recovered by
the personal representative of the deceased, such
J?'ersonal representative is acting solely as a statutory trustee for the benefit of the heirs on account
of whom the recovery is had.''
There is another similarity in the two cases. We
quote:
(At page 513) "It is interesting to note that
our original statute relative to actions of this
character (Stat. 1862, p. 448) contained a provision directing distribution of the proceeds of the
action to 'the widow and next of kin, in the
proportions provided by law in relation to the
distribution of personal proverty left by persons
dying intestate', and that, when it came to the
enactment of the Codes, the whole subject-matter
was revised, and the direction as to distribution
entirely omitted. ' '
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While In Re Riccomi, supra, may be the only authority that is cited under appellant's quotation from 16
A.m. Jur., Sec. 251, page 152, as authority that distribution, when not fixed by statute, shall be on the basis of
the pecuniary loss sustained by the distributees, there
are many other cases. See: Hurley v .. Hurley (Sup. Ct.
Okla., 1942), 127 P. (2) 147; notes, annotation 14 A..L.R.,
page 516; Schultz v. Western Farm Tractor Company,
190 P. 1007, 14 A..L.R. 514 and annotation.
In the case of Murphy v. Duluth Superior Bus Company (Sup. Ct. Minn., 1937), 274 N.W. 515," 112 A.L.R. 27,
the statute provided:
(At page 29) ''The damages therein ... shall
be for the exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse
and next of kin, to be distributed to them in the
same, provp,ortion as personal property of persons
dying intestate.'' (Italics supplied.)
The statute governing distribution provided:
(At page 29) ''If there be no issue nor spouse,
the estate shall descend to the father and mother
in equal shares, or if but one survive, then to
such survivor.''
''In ordering one-half of the balance of the
settlement money distributed to the res~ondent,
the court was merely following the clear and
express language of these statutes. It is true
that the amount of recovery under section 9657
is limited to the pecuniary loss of those for whose
benefit action may be brought. Dunnell, Minn.
Dig. (2d Ed.) Sec. 2617. And as a result, in the
action to recover in this case for the death of the
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boy, the damages \\~ould be limited to the pecuniary loss of the appellant, since the respondent
suffered no such loss because of his death.''
In this case, for the death of a child, the recovery
was divided hetween the father and the mother. The
father had divorced his wife when the child was young,
and she lived separate and apart fron1 the child. He had
borne the entire burden of SUlpport and care of the child,
and the child never knew his mother as such, and the evidence showed that she suffered no pecuniary damage. The
Supreme Court upheld the decision of the lower court
to award the mother half of the recovery. The court in
discussing this case said:
(At page 29) ''However, according to the
provisions of section 9657, once the amount of
the damages is determined and recovered, respondent is entitled to one-half of that amount.
To say that this is anomalous is somewhat of
an understatement. There can be no better illustration of how unjust the result may be than that
reached in the instant case, but this inconsistency
has been created by the Legislature and not the
court. To reach a different result would violate
the express wording ·of the statute. We have on
at least two previous occasions considered these
statutes with regard to this particular question.''
The court later in the opinion states :
(At page 29) "An amendment to section
9'657 to remedy this situation would seem to be
most desirable. That is within the province of the
Legislature and not the court.''
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As we have seen earlier in this argument, Utah and
California did correct that situation by amendment. Of
course, the court may use the laws of distribution in
probate as a guide, and, in certain circumstances, perhaps that method would furnish an equitable and just
distribution.
F.aulkner v. Faulkner (Sup. Ct. Ark., 1933), 57 S.W.
(2) 818, quoted on page 47 of appellant's hrief, says:
"The statute as inter1preted makes pecuniary
injury the basis of damage and ·of the participation in any judgment recovered. The dependence
of the plaintiff and whether or not the deceased
had contributed to his support are merely evidentiary facts from which, with other circumstances
in the case, the question of the pecuniary injury
and its ·extent is to ·be ascertained. The distribution
not having been pre'scribed by the governing statutes (Section 7138) and the mode named in section
1075 not been applicable, it becomes the duty of
the court to formulate .a rule of distribution consonant with reason and the p1rinciples of sound
justice. (Emphasis our own.)
''It is not difficult to perceive how the rule
1provided for in section 1075 or how any other
fixed and arbitrary rule might be the occasion of
an unfair division by which one in no sense in
need and in every sense unworthy and who had
received and had no right to expect any contribution would share equally with those entirely dependent and most worthy and who- had in the
lifetime of the deceased been the principal beneficiaries of his bounty and had the right to expect
that this would continue. • ~ *
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~'It

is clear that sin1ply because one is among
the number of next of kin does not entitle him to
recover damages or share \vith the others, but it
must app,ear that some pecuniary injury to him
must haYe been suffered. If then the injury suffered is the basis ·of the recovery, the extent of
that injury, as compared ,,'Jth others of the next
of kin, ought to be the measure by which his
proportionate share in the damages recovered
should be ascertained. ''
Let us see what In Re Aronowitz, 272 N.Y.S. 421,
cited in appellant's brief at 1page 45, says:
''The facts of the present case serve as a striking illustration of the inequity frequently produced by this vrocedure. Here the husband was
80 years of age at the time of the accident. His
expectancy of life was but 4.39 years. If this be
assumed that the age ·of one child was 20 and of
the other 25, their expectancies were 42.20 and
39.49 years respectively. Since the decedent was
56 years old at the time of her death, her expectancy of life was 16.72 years. It is obvious, therefore, that, all other factors being equal, the loss
from the death was approximately four times as
great for each of the children, as for the widower,
and that, viewed from this standpoint, any recovery should be divided approximately into ninths,
with four thereof being payable to each child and
only one to the husband. Under section 133 of this
statute, however, the direction is mandatory that
'the damages recovered . . . must be distributed
. . . as if they were unbequeathed assets . . . ';
in other "\Vords, that the regular devolution prescribed by the statute of distribution governs,
which in this case gives one-third to the husband
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and a like proportion to each child. Decedent
Estate Law, P. 83, subd. 1.
"It would not be difficult to imagine even
more striking inconsistencies in the application
of the law by its diversion in distribution to one
person of sums which were in .reality awarded
as compensation for the loss of another. The
remedy for the condition is, however, a legislative, and not a judicial, function.''
In Snedeker v. Snedeke,r (1900) 164 N.Y. 458, 58
N. E. 4, cited at page 48 of appellant's brief, the court
said:
''We are not insensible to the peculiar hardship of this case, where a widow, left without
means of support, is compelled to divide the net
amount of the judgment she has recovered a,..s
administratrix with a man of means (the father
of the deceased), possessed of considerable real
and ~personal property. We must, however, construe the law as it is written, regardless of the
seeming injustice inflicted in particular cases by
the existing rule.''
Counsel for appellant seems to he as confused over
the words, "pecuniary loss", as he was over our wrongful death statute. He quotes on page 55 of his brief from
Ev(JJJts v. Oregon Short Line R:a·ilroad Co., 37 U. 431, 108
P. 638:

'' * * * the jury should be admonished that in
no event can the pecuniary necessities or the vhysical requirements of the wife or children be considered for the purpose of ·enhancing the damages
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which \Yere caused by the negligent act complained
of.''
He seems to be confused bet,veen the action for wrongful death and the distribution. Certainly if a father,
"~ho \Yas a hopteless cripple and very aged and had contributed nothing to,Yards his children's support, and
\Yho only had a life expectancy of a few months, should
be killed by wrongful act, the defendant would not be
required to 1pay a great amount of damages merely
because the ,,rife and children happened to be in dire
need and in poor physical condition. However, as was
pointed out in the case cited by respondent, after recovery is made the physical conditions and pecuniary necessities of the heirs may be taken into consideration to
determine the distribution of the recovery.
On page 57 of his brief, appellant states:
''Obviously, if an heir is entitled to his proportionate share, it must he in the proportion
that he is a~ heir, otherwise the action would not
be for his benefit as an heir."
The proportion means according to the iproportion of the
heir's pecuniary loss, and it has been so held in Faulkner
v. Faulkner, supra, Snedeker v. Snedeker, supra, and
Hurley v. Hurley, supra.
Appellant complains about the lower court failing
to fix any pecuniary los·s for the p-rotestant, Edward C.
Behm, the father of the children. Behm did not object,
and, if there were any error in the court's ruling, it is
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certainly not the privilege of the appellant to raise that
question. Edward C. Behm would probably have been
entitled to a_portion of the recovery and also the amount
expended for medical services and funeral eXJpenses for
the dece~ased. He stated that he was willing that all of
the recovery go to the two babies. Behm has not cross~ppealed and he accepted the ruling of the court in that
regard.
While the respondent does not approve of Alma Gee
receiving $750.00 quantum meruit, he did not raise any
objection. He was anxious to settle -and end this litigation without having all ~of it dissipated in expensive
court proceedings. The lower court recognized the rule
that even in champertous contracts with attorneys, the
attorney is still entitled to quantum meruit, and while in
this case the lower court allowed $750.00, "rhich was far
in excess of any services rendered by Alma Gee, that
finding was not complained of by the respondent. Ordinarily, in the cases that eome up every month in our
District Court, the special rerrxr;esentative, who is merely
a figurehead, is generally a younger lawyer in the firm's
office, :and on recoveries ranging from $30,000.00 to
$100,000.00 the special administrator or representative
or trustee, call him what you will, is paid from $50.00
to $75.00.
The wppellant occupies much space in his brief setting forth the faithful, hard work and the value of the
services of Alma Gee, the appellant, hut he lets the cat
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out of the bag in his petition for approval to settle the
case against Doctor Holbrook. See Paragraph 3 (R. 11):
"That through the efforts of your petitioner's
attorney, Shirley P. Jones, the said Dr. Von G.
Holbrook has offered to pay to your petitioner

*** "

'

and that is exactly what it was. The recovery was made
solely through the efforts of Attorney Jones. The testimony of \\Titness Jones about the countless consultations
he had with this 63-year-old watchman about technical,
medical problems is absurd on the face of it. Alma Gee's
salary was $150.00 a month. The lower court allowed
him $750.00 quantum meruit. Alma Gee s1pent approximately $30.00, some of it uselessly, such as notice to
creditors. That left him $720.00, or more than he made
in four months as a watchman. The record does not
disclose that Mr. Gee lost a single, solitary day of his
work on account of his efforts as administrator, special
representative or trustee, whatever a;ppellant's attorneys wish to label him.
Appellant claims that Alma Gee was entitled to
the S'ame compensation as an attorney in this matter.
Respondent feels that the time-honored custom of attorneys paying their investigators out of their fees should
not be disturbed, ·and the respondent believes that the
client should receive at least a portion of the recovery.
The app1ellant complains of the $500.00 distributed
to ~ir. Behm for the use and benefit of his attorneys,
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plished: An attempt to take an additional attorney's
fee and administrator's fee was blocked. N otwithstanding appellant's disclaimer of attorneys' fees in the
appeal, the record clearly shows the appellant's intentions in that regard. The attempt to take $3,750.00 from
the fund by reason of a pretended assignment was
foiled, and $10,500.00 was recovered for the benefit of
those entitled to it.

POINT I.
THE VALIDITY oF THE AssiGNMENT, ExHIBIT

6.

(A) Assignability of Behm's Share of any Recovery.

The cause of action for wrongful death is nonassignable.
In the early case of Fritz v. Western Union Teleu.·~aph

·Company, et al. (1903), 25 U. 263, 71 P. 209, on

p1age 280 of the Utah Reports:
''While we do not think that such an assignment can be valid or of any effect, yet, even if it
were, still the real party vointed out by the
statute, to-wit, the personal representative of the
deceased, brought this action, and a judgment
herein will be a complete bar to any action now
or hereafter brought by the heirs or their
assignee. Rev. St., sec. 2912. Besides, this objection was urged too late, and must be held to
have been waived. 'The objection that the plaintiff in an action is not the real p·arty in interest,
as required by the Code, when available by way
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of defense, must be raised by demurrer or answer,
or it will be considered to haYe been waived.' ''

' re also depend on the case of Johanson v. Cudahy
Packing Con~pany, 100 U. 399, 115 P. (2) 794, 101 U. 219,
120 P. (2) 281, and 107 U. 114, 152 P. (2) 98.
Corptus JHris Secundum, Vol. 6, page 1082, section
33, states:
''In the absence of statutory modification, a
cause of action for death by 'vrongful act is not
assignable, and it has been held that, prior to
verdict or judgment, the beneficiary's claim for
damages is a mere expectancy, or inchoate right,
not a debt, and not assignable.''
The law does not preclude an assignment of the
claim to a representative or an administrator for the
purpose of bringing a suit, the recovery, of course, to be
held in trust for the heirs. It would be an anomalous
situation for a stranger to the action, who has suffered
no pecuniary loss, who was not an heir, to he able to
recover damages in an action for wrongful death. Even
a creditor cannot maintain such an action.
Now, let us see what appellant did in this matter.
In Case No. 80962, Alma Gee, admr., etc. v .. Von G. Holbrook, which was introduced in evidence, paragraph 10
of the complaint reads as follows:
"That as a result of the negligence and carelessness as aforesaid the said heirs of the said
deceased and the said estate of the said deceased
incurred funeral expenses in the sum of $1000.00,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

28

and were damaged in the total sum of $26,000.00,
and the plaintiff brings this action for the benefit
of said heirs.''
This was signed and filed after the execution of the
assignment, E~hi1bit 6. Why didn't the aJpi>ellant state in
said paragraph: ''and 1plaintiff brings this action for
the benefit of said minor children, Venna Julene Behm
and Cheryl Darlene Behm and Alma Gee, as assignee
of Edward C. Behm, the father"~ Witness Jones testified that Edward C. Behm was out of it before this suit
was filed. What would then have been Alma Gee's basis
of recovery or pecuniary loss~ No, Lord Campbell's
Act never was enacted for the purpose of compensating
strangers or people who might make it a practice to go
around getting assignments of another's right of action
or the proceeds of the recovery.
Personally, we cannot see the difference between the
assignment of the right of action and the assignment of
the proceeds of recovery, except !perhrups the latter
would deprive a defendant in a suit for wrongful death
of the defense that the person asking recovery suffered
no loss. Clearly the assignment was void on the face of it.
(B) There was not only an actual fraud perp,etra:ted

by Alma Gee in this oase upon the protestant, Edw~ard C.
Behm, but there was an equitable fraud by reason of the
trust and confidence .a.rising out of the relationship existing betw·een Alma Gee and Edward C. Behm, and therefo·re, Alm.a Gee has the burden of establishing that' the
assignment, Exhibit 6, w.as obtained in good faith and
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under circunzstances excluding wndue influence,
or any 11nprope r nz ewns.

decez~t,

The Utah Supreme Court is committed to the doc.
trine that fraud is presumed in transactions between 'persons occlllp~ng a fiduciary relation, and the party benefited has the burden to show that the transaction was
fair.
Omega Inv. Co. v. ~woolley (1928), 72 Utah
474, 271 P. 797.

The question arises: Did a confidential relation exist
in this case at bar~ Alma Gee was the f·ather-in-law of
Edward C. Behm. Edward C. Behm had full faith and
confidence in his father-in-law; that he was called to the
office of Attorney Jones on April 11, 1947; that Alma
Gee had seen Attorney Jones before; that they submitted
to Behm the petition for administrator and for guardianship. He had faith and confidence in Alma Gee and
consented that Gee be guardian of the estates of the
minors. He consented that Alma Gee be the special representative or administrator in whose name the doctor
was to be sued. Witness Jones claimed he informed
Behm concerning the assignment at that time on April11,
1947. This Behm denied. The court evidently believed
Witness Behm and evidently disbelieved Witness Gee
and Witness Jones. Finding No. 4 states there was no
consideration given Edward C. Behm by said Alma Gee
for said assignment, and Edward C. Behm did not fully
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comprehend the import ·of said assignment, and he had
not been fully and completely instructed as to his rights
in said matter (R. 57).
At the time Exhibit 6 was. signed, Behm had already
petitioned for the ap1pointment of Alma Gee as his special representative and trustee. It is clear that :prior to
the execution of Exhibit '6 Alma Gee had assumed to
act in the matter and take charge of the affairs concerning the suit against Doctor Holbrook. He had before
that time procured the attorney, Shirley P. Jones. He
had had the papers prepared. Under such circumstances,
it is clear that there was a confidence genera ted in
Behm's mind, repos-ed by him in his father-in-law, Alma
Gee, and he furthermore was acting in a fiduciary capacity. It in no manner or at all lessens his obligation
because he had not then been actually appointed by the
court. The assignment itself stated that he had instituted
and will continue to carry on further proceedings for the
recovery of said estate, etc.
The Supreme Court of Utah in the case of Omega

lnv. ;Co. v. Woolley, sUJpra, states:
''A confidential relation exists when confidence
is reposed by one party and a trust accepted by
the other, when a confidence has been imposed
and betrayed, or when influence has been acquired
and abused. It embraces both technical and :fiduciary relations and those informal relations where
one man trusts in and relies on another. Dale v.
Jennings, 90 Fla. 234, 107 So. 175. ''
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The Supreme Court of Utah quoted from Pomeroy

on Jurisprudence as follows:
''The doctrine of equity concerning undue
influence is very broad, and is based up1on princitples of the highest morality. It reaches every
case, and grants relief 'where influence is acquired
and abused, or where confidence is reposed and
betrayed'. It is specially active and searching
in dealing with gifts, but is applied, when necessary, to conveyances, contracts executory and
executed, and 'vills. ''
2 Pomeroy's Equity

Jurwp~udence,

Sec. 951.

The Court then held that where a confidential relation was shown to exist, the burden rested upon the
party benefited by the transaction or the transfer to show
that the fullest and fairest explanation and communication was made to the party reposing such confidence, and
that the transaction itself was fair and th·e consideration
therefor adequate, before a court is justified in permitting
such a transaction or assignment to stand.
The court said, again quoting from Pomeroy:
''Courts of equity have carefully refrained
from defining the particular instances of fiduciary
relations in such a manner that other and perhaps
new cases might be excluded. It is settled by an
overwhelming weight of authority that the principle extends to every possible case in which a
fiduciary relation exists as a fact, in which there
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ing superiority and influence on the other. The
relation and the duties involved in it need not
be legal; it may be moral, social, domestic, or
merely personal. ''
2 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, Sec. 956;
74 Utah 486.
In Odell v. Moss, 130 Cal. 352, 62 P. 555 (1900), it
appeared that a brother had deeded certain property to
his sister. It aplleared that he reposed confidence in that
sister, and the Supreme Court of California held that
under th·e circumstances the transaction was constructively fraudulent', and that the burden was upon the sister
of proving affirmatively that influence was not used
to obtain the deed. The court pointed out that the relationship of brother and sister was not in itself a fidu.-

~~

ciary relation, but that it was a material circumstance
in considering the question whether in fact such a relation existed.
The court said :
'' The evidence on this point, we think, clearly
establishes the fiduciary relation. It is ex:pressly
found by the court that by reason of the relation
existing between them, the defendant 'reposed in
plain tiff especial confidence and trust'. ( 62 P.
556)''
.
In the case at. bar, it is clear that Edward C. B·ehm
reposed great confidence in his father-in-law, Alma Gee,
at the time he signed the petition for guardianship and
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the petition for appointment of Alma Gee as adininistrator at the office of Shirley P. Jones on Aprilll, 1947,
and that he reposed great confidence in him when he
signed Exhibit 6 on the 28th day of Arpril, 1947.
On page 28 of app~ellant's brief, the assignment
referred to and it states:

IS

''The 'Assignment' is here in evidence and
demonstrates that any school boy upon reading
it would understand it.
Let us see whether or not it is understandable :
''Exhibit 6

~t~o

''Edward C. Behm, the husband of the above
entitled deceased, for a valuable consideration
for the further consideration that Alma Gee, the
father of said deceased, has instituted and will
continue to carry on further proceedings for the
recovery for said estate of anything due it for
the death of said deceased, and particularly anything due the minor children of. the undersigned,
and the said deceased does hereby assign, transfer
and set over unto the said Alma Gee all his right,
title, claim and interest in and to the said estate,
the proceeds thereof, and particularly the proceeds of any recovery made or recovered from
Von G. Holbrook, or any recovery made or recovered for the death of said deceased. It is
expressly understood that the said minor children
shall receive their full share of said estate free
and clear of this assignment to be administrated
under the guardianship proceedings heretofore
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instituted on their behalf by the said Alma Gee
with the consent of the undersigned.
"Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 28th day
of April, 1947.
(Signed) EDWARD C. BERM
Witness: (Signed) AMY C. GEE
(Signed) JULENE GEE."
It states : ''Alma Gee * * * has instituted and will
continue to carry on further proceedings for the recovery
for said estate of anything due it for the death of said
deceased''. A school boy would be misled, because the
recovery was not for the estate; it was for the heirs.
''And particularly anything due the minor children of the
undersigned". Why was that put in~ Appell~ant has insisted all along that the father had a one-third share. It
may be clear to any school hoy, but it is not clear to the
writer why that particular emphasis should be ·placed
upon the children, unless it was to convince the father,
Edward C. Behm, that this action was solely for the
benefit of the children.
And on line 7 it states: ''and the said deceased
(emphasis added) does hereby assign, transfer and set
over unto the said Alma Gee all his right, title, claim
and interest in and to the said estate, the proceeds thereof, and particularly the 1proceeds of any recovery made
or recovered from Von G. Holbrook, or any recovery
made or recovered for the death of said deceased". He
would have to be a Phi Beta K'B{Ppa school boy to figure
that one out.
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Then 'Ye come down to: ''It is expTessly understood
that the said minor children shall receive their full share
of said estate free and clear of this assignment to be
administrated under the gu·a.rdianship proceedings heretofore instituted on their behalf by the said Alma Gee
with the consent of the undersigned". What does that
mean 1 Would any school boy know what that means~
What "~as their share~ Why was that put in~ W·as that
merely again to reassure Edward C. Behm, the father of
said children, that this action was merely for the benefit of
the children J? I am afraid that Attorney Jones has either
gi\en more credit to the simpJicity of this masterpiece of
malapropism than it deserves, or he has credited the
school boy with undue perspicacity.
The above assignment is exactly as set out.
''Deceased'' is not a printer's mistake. Neither Behm,
Gee, nor Attorney Jones knew what Exhibit 6 meant.
~fr.

Perry in his work upon Trusts, Volume 1, discusses at gr_eat length the ru1es relative to constructive
trusts and constructive fraud. On ~page 352, section 205,
he says:
''The same principles apvly to attempted purchases by administrators and executors of the
estate under their charge to administer. When
the purchase is directly from beneficiaries of their
interests, or when the purchase is assented to by
all the beneficiaries, the executor or administrator
has the burden of showing that the beneficiaries
selling or those assenting to his purchase kne'v
that he was the purchaser and were fully informed
by him of everything which might influence them
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in selling their interests or assenting to his purchase of the property, and that no undue influence
was used by him and no unfairness practiced.''
And again:
"This rule is so strict, that they cannot purchase any of the assets of the estate under their
charge, although the assets are ordered by the
court to be sold at public auction."
I

In re Robertson's Estate, 1 N.Y.S. (2d) 423 (1938).
This was a decision by the surrogate court of New
York and was a proceeding in the matter of the estate
of a deceased. person. It involved the validity of an
assignment.
"An assignment made by a distributee to au
administrator or to one about to become an administrator of an estate, should be set aside when
procured through false representation.''
In this case the surrogate court quotes the language

of Judge Cardozo as follows:
''A trustee is held to something stricter than
the morals of the market ~lace. Not honesty
alone, but the ~punctilio of an honor the most
sensitive, 'is then the standard of behavior. As to
this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity
has been the attitude of courts of equity when
petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided
loyalty by the 'disintegrating erosion' of particular exceptions. Wendt v. Fischer, 243 N. Y.
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439, 444, 154 NE 303. Only thus has the level of
conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher
than that trodden by the cro,Yd. It 'vill not consciously be lo'\vered by any judgment of this
court.''
Was Behm fully informed either by Alma Gee or by
~fr. Jones·~ Absolutely not. Mr. Jones all through this
case has acted as the {Personal attorney for Alma Gee,
rather than for the heirs. He owed a duty to keep them
all fully informed. He knew when he prepared Exhibit
6 that he was attempting to prepare an instrument that
would assign a valuable right of Edward C. Behm to
Alma Gee. It was his duty to inf.orm Behm fully as to
\Yhat he thought the purport of Exhibit 6 was. Not only
did Attorney Jones fail to enlighten Edward C. Behm
fully, but he failed to keep him informed as to the progress of the case, and gave him the brush-off when he,
Behm, went to Jones' office with what he, Behm, thought
was valuable information.
Neither Attorney Jones nor Gee notified Behm that
a settlement had been made. It seems strange indeed
that the petition for administrator and the petition for
guardian were ready and waiting for Behm in Attorney
Jones' office, but this comvlicated, misleading instrument, termed an "assignment", Exhibit 6, was sent some
two weeks later by Attorney Jones with Alma Gee to
be signed away from an attorney's office. Witness Jones
testified that when he had the petition for administrator
and guardian signed, he took Behm in to another attorney, Gordon Strong, and explained the situation in front
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of Mr. Strong. It seems strange indeed that a transaction
of the importance of this one, signing Exhibit 6, and it
appears that Witness Jones and Witness Gee knew of
its importance, was not deserving of formal and regular
attention; they, knowing that Behm was signing over
all of his rights to Gee in this substantial matter, should
have seen to it that this man Behm was taken before
some disinterested attorney who would fully explain the
contents of the instrument and its legal effect.
Yes, if this Exhibit 6 is considered as a contract,
then clearly the exhibit itself is conclusive and decisive
evidence of fraud, but this exhibit and its execution is
coupled with other inequitable incidents. These incidents operate to throw the burden of proof on the party,
Alma Gee in this case, seeking to reap the benefits of
this action, and this burden of proof requires that Alma
Gee show that Edward C. Behm acted voluntarily, knowingly, intentionally, and deliberately, and with the full
knowledge of the nature and effects of his acts, and that
his consent was not obtained by any oppression, undue
influence or undue advantage taken of his condition,
situation or necessities.
2 Pomeroy's EquityJuris!p,rudence, page 1671.
Finding such fiduciary relationship existing between
the [p~arties, then the burden is upon Alma Gee to establish
that Behm acted voluntarily, and that he knowingly and
intentionally and deliberately gave his interest in the
proceeds of the recovery for the wrongful death to Alma
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Gee. It must be established that he kne"T "\Yhat he was
giving, and if the proof fails, as it does fail, to show this
intentional, deliberate act of B·ehm, then equity presumes
what is known as a constructiYe fraud, even though Alma
Gee hin1self acted in good faith and '"'ith good intention.
Constructive fraud does not depend upon the evil
intent of the person charged with such fraud, hut it rests
upon broad grounds of public policy to accomplish the
end of protecting society in general. Men are not permitted to abuse confidence, and when the relation is such
that the confidence is reposed by one person in another,
then, unless the one in whom the confidence is reposed
shall show that the transaction is fair and intentional in
every resp,ect, equity conclusively presumes what it calls
"constructive fraud". It is perfectly possible for an
attorney to m·ake a purchase from his client in perfect
good faith, or an administrator to buy the interest of an
heir in the best of faith. The transactions can be as
beneficial to the parties concerned as any other regular
trans·action, but an attorney or an administrator who
engages in such a transaction is treading upon dangerous
ground for the reason that such contracts are prima
facie fraudulent.
This contract in this case is prima facie fraudulent.
The danger of allowing such transactions to stand is that
if once the door is opened, then attorneys, administrators,
special representatives, and many others will enter at
that opening and great frauds will he committed and
unconscionable contracts will be made.
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a :person agreeing to accept a part of the proceeds
of a suit which he under guise of philanthropy
is to aid in prosecuting is guilty of champerty.
However, the assignment of a cause of action not
otherwise champertous is not made so by lack
of a full money consideration when the transfer
is between father and son, or brother and brother.''

McClellan v. Oliver, 181 S.W. (2) 784, 238 Mo. Ap'p.
409, states:
''Though persons closely bound by ties of
blood, family or affection may assist each other
in litigation in an honorable way, they may not
do so for gain of a part of the matter litigated.
''A contract to assist in litigation for a share
in the proceeds need not be entered into with bad
motives in order to be against public policy and
void.''
(The above case is where a brother and sister
contracted to join cases on adoption and S'plit
proceeds.)
Further, quoting from 14 C.J.S. 369, sec. 27:
"Provided he does not do so for the purpose
of sp,eculation, a kinsman of a suitor may render
aid in the prosecution or defense of a suit without
being guilty of champerty or maintenance.
''A person who is related by ties of consanguinity or affinity to either of the parties to a
suit may rightfully assist in the prosecution or
defense of such suit either by furnishing counsel
or by contributing to the expense thereof; but the
reason for the rule ceases and the rule is not
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tains the suit for the purpose of 1personal speculation or profit. Otherwise stated, relationships
by blood or marriage may justify maintenance,
but not champerty."
Thus we see that the assignment, Exhibit 6, along
with all its other infirmities is also champertous, and the
lower court very properly made its finding to that effect.
CON~CLUSION

We submit that the appellant certainly has no cause
to complain of the rulings of the lower court in this
matter. The allowance by the lower court to Alma Gee
of $750.00 which he had unlawfully appropriated was
much more than he was entitled to. The fact that the
lower court did not se·e fit to allow Behm more than
$500.00 in this recovery is no concern of the appellant.
Behm was willing that the balance of the money go to
the children. The fact that appellant's attorney feels
that it would be dissipated by a trust comT'any has no
hearing in the case. In passing, we might comment that
the attorney himself, while a witness on the stand, testified that he once said, "I agreed with you that the trust
company should be the one that would handle this money
for the children and that that would be satisfactory with
me'' (R. 188).
The record shows conclusively that from the beginning there was a misconception of the law. The claim for
wrongful death was treated as belonging to the estate,
even to the extent of [J'robate proceedings and the belief
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that what was left of the fund recover·ed from the doctor
,should be subject to estate attorney's fees, administrator's fees and claims of creditors.
The evidence shows beyond a peradventure of a
doubt that the complicated, unintelligible instrument,
labeled an assignment, was void on its face. It attempted
to assign something that could not be assigned. It was
champ·ertous and totally without consider·ation, and there
was an equit,able fraud perpetrated by Alma Gee in this
case upon the protestant, Edward C. Behm, and Alma
Gee failed in his burden of establishing that the assignment, Exhibit 6, was obtained in good faith and under
circumstances excluding undue influence, deceit, or other
1mpr01per means.
Therefore, the judgment of the lower court should
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
·C. VERNON LANGLOIS,
RAY :s. McCARTY

Attorneys for Protestant
and Resvp:ondent
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